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HASKER ON OMNISCIENCE
Bruce Reichenbach

I contend that William Hasker's argument to show omniscience incompatible with human
freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that
it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use
his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our
inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with
freedom) is that, from God's perspective of foreknowledge, it is as if the event has already
occurred, but that as if conditions do not tell us about the conditions under which the act
was performed (whether it was free or not).

William Hasker's article on omniscience and human freedom contributes significantly to the debate regarding their consistency. I Combining breadth with analytic
carefulness, he has clearly articulated, better than many others, not merely the
grounds for holding that omniscience is incompatible with human freedom, but
how the incompatibilist would respond to the most recent defenses of their
compatibility. Yet, despite his efforts, I remain unpersuaded. Though this only
might suggest something about my obstinacy in the face of incontrovertible
evidence, it might also reveal the complexity of an issue which has long plagued
Western theistic discussions. I would hope that it is the latter, but whatever the
case, Hasker's challenge cannot be lightly dismissed. In what follows I want to
explore what seems to me to be a problem with Hasker's discussion, a problem
which, if I am correct, relieves the threat to the compatibilist from Hasker's
proposed dilemma: either we give up the traditional view of omniscience and
deny that God has beliefs or knowledge of future free acts of agents, or else we
commit ourselves to the dubious doctrine that we can alter the past.
To begin, Hasker contends that invoking the distinction between hard and soft
facts will not rescue the compatibilist; indeed, to the contrary, the distinction,
if carefully laid out, provides support for the incompatibilist. In particular, he
argues that
(14) "Yahweh has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese
omelet for breakfast tomorrow"
is a hard fact, and that this, along with other hard facts:
(15) "If Yahweh exists, Yahweh is God,"
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and
(A2) "Necessarily, if God has always believed that a certain thing will
happen, then that thing will happen,"
entails
( II) "Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow."
So, he writes, "( II), which is jointly entailed by a set of hard facts, is itself a
hard fact: it is now unpreventable, so that it is utterly impossible that anyone at
all, even God himself, should now have the power to bring it about that Clarence
does not eat the omelet for breakfast tomorrow. If the analysis of 'hard facts'
which we have given is sound, the incompatibilist is triumphant" (136).
According to Hasker, a hard fact is "defined as a proposition which is true
(that is its factuality) and which is such that it is impossible that anyone should
have the power to bring it about that it is false (that is its hardness)" (132-133).
As such, a fact is hard if it is entailed by one or more hard facts, is a necessary
truth, or is a true, future-indifferent proposition. Further,
(C I) "An elementary proposition is future-indifferent IFF it is consistent
with there being no times after the present, and also consistent with
there being times after the present" (\33).
Finally, he argues that (14) is a hard fact because it is a future-indifferent
proposition.
But what essential properties does Yahweh possess? Necessarily, in a de re
sense, Yahweh is God. And since God is necessarily omniscient, if Yahweh
exists, he is necessarily (in a de re sense) omniscient and cannot hold a false
belief. But then (14) is a candidate for being a soft fact, for (14) is not a
future-indifferent proposition. If Clarence does not have a cheese omelet tomorrow, i.e. if the world ended now, Yahweh would not have had the belief that
Clarence would have a cheese omelet tomorrow. That is, if there were no times
after the present time, then Yahweh would not have had the belief expressed in
(14). Otherwise it would have been a false belief, something which Yahweh
cannot entertain. But then, since (14) is a soft fact, Hasker's claim regarding
(1 I)-that it is a hard fact since it is jointly entailed by a set of hard facts-is
not true, and the incompatibilist-at least at this juncture---cannot so easily
snatch the victor's laurels.
Hasker's reply to this is that we have appealed to de re necessity to establish
our point, but only de dicta necessary truths are relevant to determining which
propositions are future-indifferent. He makes this restriction on the ground that
allowing de re considerations is too generous, such that "if considerations of
this sort are relevant to the notion of a future-indifferent proposition, then there
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will be few such propositions-but clearly, they are not relevant" (134).
Granted that a universal admission of de re considerations effectively destroys
the usefulness of making a distinction between hard and soft facts, in that few
hard facts would remain, still does it follow that they are always irrelevant? It
would seem that they are relevant in those cases where de re considerations are
directly germane to the determination of the hardness or softness of a fact, that
is, germane to determining whether it is in someone's power to make the proposition under consideration false. This means that de re considerations can be
employed where they are relevant to determining whether the proposition under
consideration is truly future-indifferent. The compatibilist then can argue that
de re considerations are relevant to and cannot be excluded from considerations
regarding Yahweh's beliefs about the future, for since his beliefs must be true
[a feature which distinguishes Yahweh's beliefs from those of the ordinary
person, which point makes Hasker's introduction of (A2) relevant], his beliefs
about the future cannot be future-indifferent; their truth depends necessarily on
the future.
Of course, to invoke an exception to a general application might be deemed
suspicious, so one cannot make everything hinge on such a contention. Determining a general principle of relevance would be tricky, if not impossible. On
the other hand, it was in terms of irrelevance that Hasker excluded all de re
considerations. The above considerations suggest that sometimes de re considerations are relevant, and that therefore the incompatibilist's case cannot be made
quite as easily as this. Our argument will be bolstered if we can go on to show
that there is something amiss in the main body of the incompatibilist's argument.
To this we shall now turn.
Hasker's main argument to show that omniscience is incompatible with human
freedom he labels argument B. Briefly, it contends that if God has always
believed a certain thing about how a person will act, it is not in that person's
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing, and hence,
assuming that God has always believed that the person would act that way, that
person cannot be free with respect to that act since he cannot refrain from doing
what God has always believed he would do. What can be said about argument
B? There seems to be an ambiguity in two rB4 & B5] of three of its crucial steps:
(B3') "God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet
tomorrow" (128),
(B4) "If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing," and
(B5) 'Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God
has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast"
(123).
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And on this ambiguity rests an equivocation. The phrase" ... bring it about
that God has not always believed that thing" could either mean (a) bring it about
that God has never believed that thing, or (b) bring it about that it once was but
no longer is the case that God believed it. This latter [(b)J is not to be understood
in the sense that God changed his belief at some point, for this is made impossible
by God's omniscience. Rather, it is to be understood in the sense of a person
somehow altering, retroactively, a fact about God's prior belief. It finds its
clearest expression in Hasker's
(19) "If at T I God had always believed that [Clarence would do X at
T 2 , and it was in [Clarence's] power to refrain from doing X at T 2 ,
then it was in [Clarence's] power to bring it about that whereas it was
true at T I that God had always believed that [Clarence 1 would do X at
T 2 it was no longer true at T 2 that God had always believed that [ClarenceJ
would do X at T 2" (148).
The truth of (B4) under the first interpretation [(a)] does not follow-as Hasker
claims the truth of (B4) does-from the unalterability of the past, for it has
nothing to do with altering the past, but rather with bringing about the past. The
truth of (B4) under the second [(b)] follows from unalterability of the past. Now
whereas (B4) in sense (b) is true, (B4) in sense (a) is not true, for given the
antecedent it is still in my or Clarence's power to bring it about that God has
never believed a certain thing. It is only that that power has not been exercised.
If it had been exercised, then God would not always have (never have) believed
that thing.'
Now the issue of free agency has not to do with Clarence· s ability to alter a
belief that God has about Clarence's action. If the power to do otherwise entails
the power to alter or change a belief that God already has, then given that God
is omniscient and cannot entertain mistaken beliefs, the incompatibilist would
appear to be assured of his victory at the outset. Rather it has to do with Clarence's
ability to bring about the future (freely) and coincidently to bring about God's
belief in the first place. Regarding the latter, Clarence only needs the power to
bring about God's belief concerning his omelet eating, not the power to change
a belief which God already has, for what beliefs God has about what Clarence
does depend upon what Clarence does. Since it is in Clarence's power to bring
about what God has believed regarding his eating breakfast tomorrow, (B5),
interpreted in the sense of (a), is false. Clarence can bring it about that God
never believed he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. And if (B5) is false,
then, granted the validity of Hasker's argument, either (or both) (B3') or (B4)
is false. As I have just argued, it is (B4), interpreted in sense (a), which is false.
Correspondingly, (B5) interpreted in sense (b) is true-Clarence cannot alter a
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belief which God already has-but irrelevant to the issue of freedom of agency.
Our argument rests on the distinction between bringing about and altering the
past; how is this to be understood? In trying to understand George Mavrodes's
interpretation of our power over the past, Hasker introduces the notion of precluding circumstances (147). According to this interpretation, we have the power
to affect the past, but are precluded from doing so by certain circumstances. I
believe that there is an insight here which provides a clue to resolving the
omniscience problem, not by showing that altering the past or (19) makes sense,
but by suggesting why there is a real difference between bringing about the past
and altering it, and why it is only the former that the compatibilist need uphold;
and in consequence, this insight provides a way out of Hasker's compatibilist
dilemma.
To begin with, Hasker asks, "Why is it that [Clarence] (apparently) lacks
freedom to do X at T2? Because God always has believed that [Clarence] would
do X at T 2, which logically precludes [Clarence] from refraining from doing X
at T 2" (147). But one might carry this another step. What is it that precludes
God from having always believed that Clarence would not do X at T 2? It is that
Clarence does X at T 2. That is, from God's perspective (that offoreknowledge),
it is as if Clarence has already done X at T 2. Thus, what it is that apparently
precludes Clarence from refraining from doing X at T 2 is Clarence doing X at
T 2. But this relation-Clarence actually doing X at T 2 entailing that Clarence
cannot refrain from doing X at Tr-does not then remove Clarence's freedom
regarding doing X at T 2. It says nothing about the conditions under which
Clarence does X at T 2. To put it another way, if it is now true that Clarence
will do X at T 2, then there are certain precluding conditions-the truth of thiswhich necessitate that Clarence cannot refrain from doing X at T 2 . But the truth
of this is conditioned by what Clarence does at T 2. That is, what precludes
Clarence from refraining to do X at T 2 is that, given that the proposition about
his future act is true, it is as if Clarence has done X at T 2 . 3
One might, of course, be perplexed about the "as if' here invoked. Yet I do
not think it that hard to comprehend. Consider the following. Parsons (P) has
invented a special machine which allows him to go back in time. He enters the
machine in 1986 and finds himself in the presence of or, perhaps better, observing,
Quigly (Q) in 1876. P is an authority on Q, and knows immediately the situation
Q is in. Not only that, but he remembers reading about the particular decision
or act which Q made in that situation. Thus one might argue that from P's
perspective what Q decides is as if already done. It is not already done, since
P is standing there waiting for Q to do it. He has gone back in time. Yet from
P's perspective, which is of one come back from the future, it is as if already
done, since he knows what Q does decide. Since P strongly believes in the
unalterability of the past, it is not within Q's power to do something other than
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what Q in fact does in that situation. From Q's perspective his decision is not
already made nor is the action taken, so that it is in his power at that time to
do either x or y. From his perspective, that he will do x rather than y is indeterminate; it is not yet done, though at the same time he can grant that P knows
what he will do because for him it is as if he has already done it.
What is the significance of this introduction of precluding conditions? What
it suggests is (1) a basis for a real difference between bringing about and altering
the past, and (2) a basis for a difference between our inability to alter the past
and our apparent inability to act freely in bringing about the future. Regarding
(1), a person is precluded from altering the past because the past has already
occurred. However, one is not precluded from bringing about the past (which
is not future indifferent) because the past which is to be brought about has not,
in a certain sense, occurred. For example, I cannot alter the fact that Luther was
born or that he nailed the 95 theses to the church door. However, I can bring it
about that Luther has a certain property, i.e. that he was born 502 years before
I wrote this, by writing this within a certain time span. This non-future-indifferent
propel1y he did not have until r wrote this, though it is now a property possessed
by a long-deceased Luther. More relevant to our case, by eating an omelet
Clarence can bring it about not only that a certain belief of God is true, but that
God has a certain belief, though Clarence cannot alter a prior belief because he
is precluded from doing so by virtue of an omniscient God already having that
belief. In the latter case there are precluding conditions, in the former not.
Regarding (2), there is a difference between the conditions which preclude
our altering the past and those which give the appearance that we cannot act
freely in bringing about the future. We cannot alter the past because the event
has already occurred. And we cannot alter the future which God already believes
(cannot do other than God believes we will do) because (from God's perspective
of foreknowledge) it is as if we have already done the event. That in the one
case the act was done, and that in the other it is as if done, are both the precluding
conditions for our not being able to alter the past or the future known by God,
and at the same time are the conditions for God having the relevant beliefs. It
is this latter which gives the (mistaken) appearance that we cannot freely bring
about the future.
But note that neither case--our inability to alter the past nor our inability to
alter the future known by God-speaks to the question of human freedom, for
both the past action which was done and the action which we have yet to do
can still have been or be free respectively. That is, though we cannot alter the
future which God foresees because for him it is as if already performed, we can
freely bring about the future, for the ground of his foreseeing it is our bringing
it about. Hence, epistemologically the freely bringing it about precedes and
determines his foreseeing and believing it. That is, there is nothing for him to
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foresee or believe with respect to Clarence's eating the omelet except what
Clarence brings about. Similarly with the past; there is nothing for God (or us)
to know about the past unless that past is brought about.
In short, though we are unable to alter the past (because it is past) and the
future which God knows (for the reason that God has certain beliefs about it),
the inability to alter has no implications for our ability in the past to bring about
freely the past or now to bring about the future. We can freely bring about the
future by our actions (because God's beliefs about our actions are conditioned
by our actions), and, with respect to God's beliefs about the future, in a meaningful
way bring about the past (because again God's beliefs about our actions are
conditioned by our actions).
If I am correct about this, then there really is an equivocation going on in
(B4) and (BS), for there really is a significant difference between bringing about
and altering. If there is an equivocation, then the compatibilist can agree that
(B4) is true in sense (b) but at the same time hold that it is irrelevant to (BS)
understood as relevant [i.e. as sense (a)] to the issue of divine foreknowledge
and human freedom. And (B4) and (BS) are both false if interpreted in sense
(a). Consequently, the compatibilist is not impaled on either of the horns of
Hasker's dilemma.
Juniata College

NOTES
I. William Hasker. "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1985).
pp. 121-157. References to the article will be placed in the text.

2. To put it another way. it makes sense to have a set of propositions. namely about God's beliefs
about future contingents of free agency, which it is in someone's power-specifically the agent of
those actions-to make false. This, of course, does not mean that God held false beliefs, only that
statements to the effect that he held certain beliefs would be false, depending on what we do.
3. It is this which mitigates Hasker's critique of the way we handled (B4). Hasker argues that
interpretation (a) will not work for (B4) because "the consequent of (B4) has to do with a power
which must be exercised under the circumstance that God has always believed a certain thing (e.g.,
that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow). So (B4) stands, and so does my
argument for incompatibilism" (in personal conversation). But God's belief regarding Clarence stands
under the circumstance that it is true that Clarence will eat the omelet (which he labels B I), and
this is true because Clarence will in fact eat the omelet at T 2' Thus Clarence actually eating the
omelet at T2 conditions the remainder, and in particular, Clarence's inability to alter God's belief
regarding his eating. It is not enough to plead that God eternally believes x; the ground of this belief
must be sought.

